By Bernd Fischer
It is becoming increasingly difficult to justify yet another book dealing with some aspect of World War II. Of all the armed conflicts of past centuries, World War II has engendered the most interest as well as an exhausting amount of written material. The opening of the Soviet archives and the recent commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the many defining moments of the war have resulted in yet another spate of books and films that examine the conflict in retrospect. But most of the research and interest naturally concentrate on the major theaters of war and the major figures involved. Little wars are often overlooked. Yet in the small state the human suffering was no less pitiful, the destruction no less devastating, the heroism no less laudatory, the treachery no less despicable, and the impact no less profound.
Albania counts as one of these forgotten theaters, in which the struggle was on a smaller scale, although it did not seem that way to the Albanians. The struggle was long and intense, and for the Albanians it was disturbingly familiar. The Albanians have known more than their share of war, often invaded but perhaps never fully conquered. In World War I alone, the newly created state of Albania was invaded and occupied by no fewer than six different foreign armies. Enver Hoxha—Albania’s Stalinist dictator until his death in 1985—was fond of repeating the often-quoted adage that Albanians have hacked their way through history with a sword in hand in order to build socialism with a pickax and a rife. The reference may be overly colorful, but there is a certain truth to the assertion, particularly in the context of World War II. Although not as dramatic as it was elsewhere, the war began earlier and lasted longer in Albania. The Italians invaded and occupied Albania in April 1939, well before the German invasion of Poland and before World War II officially began, though it did not seem that way to many Albanians.
In a certain sense the war in Albania can be seen as a microcosm of the war in the rest of the Balkans and in Europe as a whole. Albania suffered from all of the same complexities, if not more. In the short run, the Italian invasion and the subsequent German invasion were unsuccessfully resisted by the brave few. Collaborators were found to fashion puppet governments, and resistance was organized to punish the traitors and expel the invaders. As is true of other areas of Europe, this resistance fragmented along political lines. The Allies found it difficult to decide which group to support but nevertheless played an important role in terms of leadership and supplies. The invaders were finally expelled and the collaborators liquidated, as in other areas of Europe. At the end of the war in Albania, in late 1944, the communists found themselves unchallenged and assumed both military and political leadership.
But Albania’s unique internal conditions produced significant variations in the theme, and below a familiar surface the complications become endless. During the Italian occupation the fragmentation among the resistance, for example, was much more severe than in other parts of the Balkans or in Europe. To complicate matters, many of these resistance groups proved to be inconsistent, occasionally cooperating with the invader, then turning to resistance, then reverting to cooperation. This vacillation can be explained, at least partially, by the lack of a fully developed sense of nationalism. As a result, the reaction of individual groups often depended principally on regional, tribal, and local considerations. This lack of a fully developed nationalism also determined the response of many of the tribal chieftains to the invaders; they looked to play the various forces off against each other and thereby achieve some advantage for their areas. It is simple to judge many of these Albanian leaders in light of Vidkun Quisling and label them as traitors, but that would attribute to them a level of nationalist sophistication that they did not yet possess.
Many aspects of Albania’s experience under German occupation are also unique Albania’s peculiar internal conditions, as well as German needs, allowed for the creation of a surprisingly independent occupation regime. This government, by doing away with most outward signs of fascism and following a reformist political and economic policy, managed to attract a significant amount of genuine popular support. Much of this came as a surprise to both the Germans and the Allies, sending them scrambling for information upon which to construct an effective policy. In the long run neither side succeeded in understanding the Albanians, and both failed to effectively control the situation.
Although both the Allies and the Axis failed, the impact of their struggle was crucial for the Albanians. In the short term the Axis powers relied on and temporarily bolstered the prewar political and social structure, and they provided some immediate economic relief. But as the war dragged on, the prewar political structure was destroyed, and the social structure was undermined while the early economic advantages quickly dissipated. The Allies provided the Albanian resistance not only with an ideology but also with a considerable part of the material resources required to conduct effective resistance.
The war’s long-term impact—as in other areas of Europe—was profound and often paradoxical. The war changed everything. Axis policy was principally responsible for guaranteeing that the prewar political and social structure could not be resurrected. The war, in general, pulled Albania out of one form of isolation but propelled it into another. Prior to the war, Albania was arguably the most isolated country in Europe. The wartime experience forcibly brought Albania into contact with foreigners, their ideas, and their guns. But while the Albanians were exposed to the outside world, the experience of the war strongly reinforced a traditional xenophobia for which the Albanians are legendary, a xenophobia reinforced and exploited by Hoxha’s Stalinist government in the postwar world. Enver Hoxha found that Albania’s experience during the war was his most useful tool in maintaining power based upon what has been called a state-of-siege or garrison-state mentality, which emphasized the danger that foreigners represented.
Under Hoxha’s iron hand a powerful resistance myth was created, in which the Albanian people heroically defeated and expelled the fascist invaders. This myth became the common bond, and Albania’s wartime experience dominated all aspects of existence in Albania until the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. Writers, including the country’s preeminent novelist, Ismail Kadare, used the war as the major theme of many of their works; Albanian art and drama, even its currency, concentrated on the resistance; Albanian education was not allowed to separate itself from the antifascist struggle. Every aspect of Albanian civilization was measured by the wartime experience. It is not possible to understand the Albanians—something that is rapidly becoming more necessary with the recent opening up of Albania to the rest of the world—without a clear understanding of Albania at war. World War II might be an overexploited topic, but in this case an understanding of Albania from 1939 to 1945 is crucial if the Albanians of the late 1990s are to be dealt with intelligently. As Albania strives to become part of Europe in a real sense for the first time and is thrust unprepared into the international spotlight because of the continuing tragedy of the Balkans in the 1990s and Albania’s own near collapse in 1997, an understanding of the war years, which did so much to shape the state and nation over the past fifty years, is valuable. It is hoped that this work will contribute to that understanding. It is further hoped that Albania at War will provide some moments of interest for Balkan and European specialists and some small enlightenment and enjoyment for the general reader.
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