The Albanian Prime Minister’s suggestions have largely and consistently proven not to be in Kosovo’s best interest
October 29, 2025
By Veton Suroi
Last week, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama offered a new recommendation for Kosovo in the process of normalizing relations with Serbia:
“In my view, Kosovo should completely forget Serbia meaning it should unilaterally fulfill all dialogue requirements and, as we say, leave the ball at Serbia’s door. It should then tell Europe, all European countries, and even those that haven’t recognized it yet: ‘Here we are. We have fulfilled and signed everything now go and get Serbia’s signature.’ Kosovo must detach itself completely from Serbia and stop living with the idea of Serbia.”
This is not the first time Prime Minister Rama has put forward such a recommendation, and the passage of time has not made the idea any more mature. The proposal is flawed on at least three levels and the first, most essential one is that Kosovo has no problem with any neighbor other than Serbia. Therefore, it cannot simply “forget” or ignore Serbia. Independent Kosovo is already detached from Serbia and does not “live with the idea of Serbia.” However, independent states live in interdependence and when relations are poor, this affects security, development, and international standing. The normalization process is meant to place a positive prefix on that interdependence one in which Serbia’s actions would no longer harm Kosovo’s security, development, or global position (and vice versa: where Serbia could see Kosovo as a friendly neighbor, not as a threat to its national interests).
2.
The second level of weakness in Prime Minister Rama’s idea lies in the format of the negotiation process. Kosovo has gone through previous negotiations in Rambouillet (1999) and Vienna (2007) where Serbia rejected agreements that Kosovo then implemented unilaterally. That approach brought Kosovo both liberation (through NATO intervention) and independence (via the Ahtisaari Plan). While Kosovo could be liberated and made independent without Serbia’s consent, it cannot make Serbia a good neighbor if Serbia does not wish to be one.
To reach the lowest common denominator of good-neighborly interstate relations, the European Union proposed the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement, modeled after the Basic Treaty between the two Germanies. This agreement, regarded by Brussels as reached between two countries, is founded on the equality of the parties of two sovereign states that do not deny each other’s subjectivity, even if they stop short of mutual recognition. Such an agreement cannot be implemented unilaterally for the simple reason that Kosovo, like any other state, cannot “normalize interstate relations” with itself and because the very essence of this agreement is mutuality: it exists so that Kosovo and Serbia may both act as good neighbors, contributing jointly to the agreed principles.
3.
The third level of weakness concerns a misunderstanding of how the normalization process has actually unfolded. Kosovo, through Prime Minister Kurti, publicly accepted the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement and even offered to sign it. Serbia, through President Vučić, publicly expressed reservations about the Agreement both in Brussels and Ohrid, and later formalized these reservations in a written letter by then–Prime Minister Brnabić. This letter of reservations, submitted under the rules of the Vienna Convention, amounted to Serbia’s rejection of the Agreement’s foundation namely, the equality of two sovereign states. Since this letter has never been withdrawn under Vienna Convention procedures, Serbia has still not accepted the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement.
In diplomatic terms, this stance has been matched by concrete actions from blocking Kosovo’s international identity to organizing the paramilitary attack in Banjska, an operation carried out with the knowledge or participation of Serbian state organs.
In this situation, Kosovo is in fact upholding its obligations under the Brussels–Ohrid Agreement, while Serbia does not consider itself bound by it. This is precisely the situation where Prime Minister Rama’s recommendation should have been activated that the European Union, since “the ball is in Serbia’s court,” should press Belgrade to implement the Agreement, allowing, for instance, Kosovo to open a diplomatic mission in Belgrade and raise its flag.
It is clear, however judging from the EU’s past actions that this will not happen. For the record, the EU has imposed punitive measures on Kosovo for its so-called “unilateral actions” (such as mayors entering their municipal offices) while taking no action whatsoever against the state whose self-declared organizer of the Banjska paramilitary assault remains at large.
4.
Prime Minister Rama has been consistent in offering ideas and suggestions to Kosovo and, just as consistently, these ideas have proven not to serve Kosovo’s interests. At one point, he offered a draft statute for the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities. That offer created the impression that there was a shortcut to normalization and that some Albanians though not those living in Kosovo were ready to take it. It also fostered another false impression: that Kosovo’s legal and procedural framework (in this case, its laws on local self-governance) was irrelevant to building inter-municipal cooperation, and that everything could instead be solved by the will of a single leader producing “enlightened” solutions.
In another instance, Rama proposed placing northern Kosovo under NATO administration effectively creating two systems of authority in Kosovo, one of which would suspend the civil power of the Republic of Kosovo. Such an arrangement would align neatly with Serbia’s long-standing objective, dating back to 1999 to establish a separate governing authority in Serb-majority areas with a chain of command leading to Belgrade, rather than institutional dependence on Pristina.
In the interview where he most recently aired his idea for Kosovo, Prime Minister Rama explained that despite criticism of his actions toward Kosovo, “I do not take back a single comma of what I’ve said, nor do I regret anything I’ve done, because I have done it all in the interest of Albania.”
Whether Rama’s actions toward Kosovo have truly served Albania’s interests is open to debate for how could actions contrary to Kosovo’s interests possibly be in Albania’s interest? But there should be no debate over one basic principle: that the prime minister of a neighboring country ought to consult with Kosovo’s authorities before making public proposals, suggestions, or statements about Kosovo. This is a fundamental rule of good neighborly relations.
Perhaps this would be a sound starting point for redefining what Albania’s interests truly are.
____________________Veton Surroi is a Kosovar publicist, politician and former journalist. Surroi is the founder and former leader of the Ora political party, and was a member of Kosova assembly from 2004 to 2008.
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