By Augustin Palokaj
Tirana Times, March 03 2026 – EU enlargement does not lack ideas; it lacks political will. That is why the recent joint opinion piece by Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama and Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, published in the German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, is troubling not so much for what it proposes, but for what it signals. The text offers little that is new. It asks for an “alternative” to full EU membership that, in many ways, already exists through the EU’s current framework of gradual integration. More importantly, it suggests that the authors do not believe in timely accession. For Serbia’s leader, that posture may be unsurprising. For Albania’s prime minister, it is difficult to justify and potentially damaging.
The relationship between Rama and Vučić is a subject in its own right, and leaders are free to choose their partners and intellectual companions. Others are equally free to disagree. But beyond personal rapport, the political meaning of a joint initiative matters, especially when it implicitly places Albania and Serbia in the same basket. The two countries are in fundamentally different positions, and their trajectories toward the EU are not comparable. Albania advanced dramatically over the past year, opening all negotiating chapters, while Serbia has remained stuck largely because of its own choices, not because of EU obstruction.
Only two months ago, EU leaders were praising Albania’s progress in unusually strong terms, even describing it as one of the front-runners of the enlargement process alongside Montenegro. Expectations were growing that the next phase would focus on closing chapters, not merely opening them. Against that backdrop, it is perplexing that Albania’s prime minister would step forward with Serbia’s president to promote an alternative to full membership, implying that accession is not realistically achievable and attributing this to enlargement hesitation inside the EU.
Yes, hesitation exists, and it is particularly visible in major member states such as France and Germany. But viewed across the Union as a whole, skepticism toward enlargement has declined compared to previous years, and support has increased. In that climate, it would at least be understandable if an EU member state proposed models to manage enlargement. It is far less understandable, and ultimately counterproductive, for candidate-country leaders to do so. Candidates that truly seek membership should be applying pressure for faster accession, not scaling down their ambitions so easily.
Enlargement succeeds when there is will, both in Brussels and in candidate capitals. Yet the Rama–Vučić text talks about ideas while saying little about their willingness to meet the criteria that ultimately determine progress. That is the core problem. The EU process is not primarily a marketplace of concepts; it is a test of strategic orientation and reform performance. On both dimensions Albania and Serbia stand far apart. This is precisely why the use of phrases like “our two countries” in a joint text is so awkward and misleading.
Two things are decisive for any candidate seeking EU membership. First is political will: an unambiguous strategic commitment to the European path. Second is performance: credible success in meeting accession standards. Albania and Serbia could hardly be further apart on either measure.
Albania’s public support for the EU is near universal, frequently measured around 97 percent. Prime Minister Rama himself has joked that the remaining few percent are either upset with their partners or were interrupted by a football match when the pollsters called. That humor points to a serious fact: Albania has a broad societal, cultural, and political consensus on EU membership. Albania is also a NATO member, and its pro-Western orientation is not in doubt. Even parties that polarize Albanian society on other issues converge on the EU objective.
Serbia is the opposite case. Public opinion there is more skeptical than supportive of the EU. President Vučić and his inner circle often employ harsh rhetoric toward the Union and the West, labeling them hypocrites or even “occupiers,” including through narratives tied to Kosovo. Years of that messaging, amplified by pro-government media, have helped produce a public climate where many citizens believe the EU should meet Serbia’s conditions rather than the other way around. According to polling data cited from the Eurobarometer in autumn 2025, only 38 percent in Serbia held a positive view of the EU, while trust in Russia and China was markedly higher, with figures around 59 percent and 57 percent respectively.
The difference is not only about sentiment; it is about policy choices and compliance. Albania’s progress has come because it has met key conditions, while Serbia has often refused to do so. Serbia has not acknowledged the genocide in Srebrenica. It has not meaningfully advanced normalization with Kosovo. It has shown no readiness to take adequate measures against those responsible for the terrorist attack in Banjska. It does not align with EU positions on Russia, Iran, Belarus, China, and other international issues, and it has refused to join EU sanctions on Russia. It has disregarded requirements concerning electronic media regulation, failed to uphold judicial independence, undermined media freedom, and not taken serious action against those who attack and threaten journalists. It has not reformed electoral rules convincingly and has not held responsible those implicated in electoral irregularities.
These concerns are not conjecture; they are clearly reflected in the European Commission’s progress reporting on Serbia. Yet it may be unrealistic to expect Albania’s prime minister, or even his cabinet, to have closely studied Serbia’s progress report. It is also fair to ask whether they have read Albania’s own, because a careful reading would show that Albania’s performance in meeting European standards is not as uniformly impressive as public celebrations sometimes imply. Montenegro, for example, remains ahead in many dimensions of technical readiness.
This context also explains why Serbia’s negotiation process is repeatedly blocked: each step requires unanimity among EU member states. Notably, the countries that have blocked Serbia tend to be strongly pro-enlargement rather than opponents of expansion. In other words, blaming “enlargement fatigue” for Serbia’s stagnation is increasingly inaccurate at this stage. That fatigue did not prevent progress by Montenegro and Albania. Serbia’s obstacles are largely self-inflicted.
Some will criticize Rama for co-authoring an op-ed with Vučić at a moment when Serbia’s leader threatens Kosovo, insults Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attacks the EU in inflammatory language. Those critics may have a point. But even beyond regional sensitivities, the timing and content of this joint initiative have puzzled many in the EU, including supporters of enlargement. It is as if the authors forgot that gradual integration is already under way.
The region’s countries already have Stabilisation and Association Agreements that open much of the EU market, enabling exports without customs duties, provided products meet EU standards. They enjoy visa liberalisation, participate in numerous EU programs, and maintain regular cooperation and meetings at all levels, from technical experts to ministers to leaders. The EU–Western Balkans summits have become routine, including one hosted in Tirana. Enlargement countries have even been brought into the European Economic and Social Committee through a pilot arrangement that could be extended to other EU bodies. European roaming integration for the region is also approaching. Alongside these steps, the Berlin Process continues to advance and would be even more successful if not for obstruction by Serbia and by the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Regional Cooperation Council functions effectively as well. With goodwill, much more could be achieved using existing mechanisms without inventing new “alternatives.”
Inside the EU, serious discussions do exist about how to absorb new members and manage the institutional impact of enlargement. Yet many analyses carried out without political pressure conclude that even admitting ten countries at once would not produce a shock larger than the major 2004 enlargement. The challenge is therefore not a shortage of models; it is a shortage of political decisions, both in member states and in candidate capitals.
Why, then, did Rama and Vučić write such a piece? Perhaps to please someone. Perhaps for other motives. But for Albania the risk is clear: it can be read as a loss of ambition. That perception could be seized upon by a growing current in the EU that argues for admitting Montenegro first and then “we’ll see” about the others. Albania has advanced partly because it began distancing itself from Serbia and from the political adventures associated with the “Open Balkan” initiative. A renewed rapprochement, especially one that rhetorically aligns Albania’s EU path with Serbia’s, could slow Albania’s momentum by tying it to Serbia’s pace. And that slowdown would show up in the one measure that now matters most for Albania’s credibility: the speed and seriousness with which negotiating chapters are closed.
Albania’s interests are not served by importing Serbia’s doubts or by sharing the same lowered horizon. If Albania truly aims to join the EU, its leaders should be reinforcing confidence and urgency, not projecting hesitation. The message to Brussels should be clear: Albania will keep moving, keep reforming, and keep insisting that full membership remains the goal, not an optional destination to be replaced with substitutes that already exist in practice.
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