Navigating Albania-China Relations amid Euro-Atlantic Commitments
During the post-communist period, Albania’s priorities were largely defined by the need to rebuild its economy, modernize infrastructure, and reintegrate into the global political and economic systems. In its pursuit of development and modernization, the Albanian government sought partnerships with a wide array of international actors, welcoming investment and trade opportunities from diverse sources. Amidst these efforts, China struggled to emerge as a major partner in key sectors such as trade and infrastructure.
Among the most notable instances of Chinese investment in Albania during the mid-2010s were Geo-Jade Petroleum’s acquisition of Bankers Petroleum, granting control over the Patos-Marinza oilfield—the largest onshore oilfield in Europe—and China Everbright’s purchase of the concession for Tirana International Airport. Moreover, a Turkish-Chinese consortium, has been managing Albania’s four largest copper mines near Pukë, Shkodër and Mirditë and the Fushë-Arrëz processing plants, becoming the country’s leading copper producer, with a concession valid until 2043. A number of other initiatives encountered obstacles. For example, in 2016, a Chinese construction company withdrew from the $200 million Arber Road project, which was subsequently taken over by Albania’s Gjoka Construction Company in partnership with the government. Similarly, discussions with Chinese investors on projects such as the Blue Corridor and the Arber Road did not materialize, leading Albania to turn to alternative partners.
Learning on the experiences of other Western Balkan countries
China’s investment strategy in the Balkans has largely centered on fossil fuel-related industries, such as energy production, transport, and mining, while non-energy sectors have received limited attention. Of the 21 greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions in the region, only a handful have extended beyond energy, such as Huawei’s involvement in telecom and metal processing projects. This selective approach reveals China’s tendency to align investments with its broader strategic objectives, rather than prioritizing comprehensive economic engagement.
For instance, Chinese companies have revitalized Serbia’s steel and mining industries, notably through the acquisition of the Smederevo steel plant in a very favorable deal. Moreover, they have acquired a concession of the copper and gold mines in the city of Bor, which has become Serbia’s lead exporter of extractives to China in the Balkans. Serbia’s openness to Huawei’s 5G infrastructure development also underscores the depth of its economic integration with China, making it the leading recipient of Chinese outreach in the Balkans. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented political system makes it particularly vulnerable to exploitation, with Beijing leveraging the lack of national cohesion to advance its agenda without meaningful accountability or oversight. In North Macedonia and Montenegro, both NATO allies Chinese investments have remained limited and subject to scrutiny, while both countries actively work on developing FDI screening mechanisms.
Albania stands in front of the same obligation -to develop FDI Screening- given the EU negotiating position on cluster 6, which states that “The EU notes that there is no legislation governing the screening of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Albania and welcomes Albania’s commitment to assess the alignment needs and modalities by the end of 2026. The EU underlines the importance for Albania to align with the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 on FDI screening. “
The FDI screening mechanism will be necessary also to properly screen the upcoming and ever growing investments from Gulf countries particularly the UAE, as well as other non-EU countries.
Conclusion
China’s engagement in Albania faced notable limitations. While certain investments in key sectors were significant, sustained and expansive economic engagement proved elusive. For instance, by the end of 2020, the concession for Tirana International Airport had been transferred to an Albanian company, marking a reduction in Chinese involvement. Albania’s geopolitical orientation remained firmly rooted in its Western alliances, with ambitions for EU membership and strong ties with the United States serving as pivotal pillars of its foreign policy. Delays in the EU accession process have not led to a shift in Albania’s foreign policy toward non-Western powers, as the country’s leadership and public opinion continues to champion the Euro-Atlantic framework.
As the country navigates the challenges of balancing Chinese investments with its Western integration goals, it must remain vigilant to safeguard its sovereignty and long-term interests and to ensure that foreign investments promote sustainable development while preserving Albania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation and strategic autonomy. In that context and in the broader framework of alignment with the EU legislation, adopting and FDI screening mechanism would be a logical next step.
——This article was produced as part of the project ‘Countering Chinese Influence in Southeast Europe”, funded by NED and implemented by ESTIMA as a lead partner.
1 EUROPEAN UNION COMMON POSITION − Cluster 6: External Relations, ASD 25/24; adopted 13 December 2024. (pg 5)
