By Sylë Ukshini
The greatest ambassador of the Albanian nation in the world, of all time, has been and will remain, without any doubt, our world-renowned writer, Ismail Kadare. In an article written exclusively for the well-known French newspaper “Le Monde” on December 14, 1999, he recounted ten years earlier, in an office just four meters away from the office of the President of France, when he asked, “Why is no one talking about the Albanians of Kosovo, while horror has already begun there?” a friend of his had sincerely answered: “Unfortunately, Albania is not in fashion.” I paraphrase this to illustrate that, whether we like it or not, today Kosovo is no longer in fashion, but Serbia is. Despite being pro-Russian and pro-Chinese, Serbia is now considered more favored in European chancelleries, for many political, economic, historical, and cultural reasons.
In the past 25 years, despite our countless mistakes and limitations, we have done nearly everything possible to achieve independence and become part of the EU. Since June 1999, when the international military-civilian presence was established in Kosovo, what haven’t we done? I believe no country has done more in the last 25 years than what was asked of it by international decision-making centers. Kosovo and its political elite have been the most compliant in the region, and perhaps even in Europe. Unfortunately, the political elites have often been perceived by the local public as servile and humiliated.
During the Vienna negotiation process in 2006-2007, they asked us to establish ten Serbian municipalities, some even smaller than villages, and we did so to demonstrate our cooperation and willingness. They asked us to discourage the unification of Kosovo with Albania—we complied with zeal and dedication. They requested the creation of security zones around Serbian cultural and religious monuments (as outlined in the Ahtisaari Plan), with a clear description of the space allocated to them and a form of internal sovereignty that could not be violated under any circumstances—we agreed, even though this was stigmatizing for Kosovo’s majority Albanian population. They asked for reserved seats for the Serbian community, and according to Article 144 of the Constitution of Kosovo, any constitutional changes could not be made without the approval of two-thirds (2/3) of all Assembly members holding the guaranteed seats for representatives of non-majority communities in the Republic of Kosovo—we accepted this. They asked us to place a footnote on Kosovo’s name so that Serbia would agree to our participation in regional organizations—we complied, even though we didn’t like it. They requested that, for 25 years, Serbs in the north not pay for electricity—we accepted this, despite being poor. They told us to allow Serbs to move without license plates—we agreed, even confiscating an Albanian citizen’s vehicle over such an issue. In the end, we even accepted a tribunal exclusively for Kosovo Albanians, even though we euphemistically call it the Specialized Chambers. We did this at a time when thousands of Albanian families had not yet found justice for their relatives who were killed or abducted during the last war. In Ohrid, they asked us to accept the Ohrid Agreement/Annex (March 2023), and we accepted it, even though it was neither comprehensive nor legally binding, and it did not resolve all the open issues between Kosovo and Serbia.
On the other hand, Serbia not only mocked the agreement but also tested the international community by committing acts of aggression against us through military and paramilitary units supported by Vucic’s neo-Milosevic government—a well-known tactic of the Serbian state since the early 20th century.
For several years now, no one in the EU or the US has been discussing mutual recognition, which implies that they have abandoned the previous demand for a “comprehensive, legally binding agreement that would resolve all outstanding issues between the parties.” Thus, it is disappointing but true that the dialogue established by the UN General Assembly Resolution in September 2010 has failed to achieve its two main objectives: Kosovo has not become part of the international system, and Serbia has not been Europeanized.
If for fourteen consecutive years Belgrade, even after receiving a legal blow from the International Court of Justice, declared that the “issue of Kosovo” must be “resolved through compromise,” which “cannot be achieved through coercion for Serbia to recognize Kosovo as an independent state” (Dacic), this sentiment has now begun to be unanimously echoed by the international community, which asserts that “there can be no normalization without compromise.”
However, the issue of compromises has turned into an endless telenovela. According to the Ohrid Annex, as soon as we finalize the Association, we will encounter the next compromise—new arrangements for the Church. Perhaps the most significant and poignant observation regarding the compromises made by the Kosovar side comes from the Austrian diplomat Albert Rohani, a co-author of the Ahtisaari Plan, who stated several years ago that compromises from the Kosovar side have been ongoing since 2007, when we accepted the Ahtisaari Plan for the sake of Kosovo’s independence, clarifying that “there has been a lack of reciprocity from Serbia, which continues to maintain a hostile stance towards Kosovo.”
In this situation, it is unclear what more we need to do to be treated well by the international community. If we are waiting for Belgrade to one day say, “Enough, we are now satisfied with the concessions made by the Albanians of Kosovo,” that will never happen. On the contrary, anyone who knows the history of the region understands that Serbia, always backed by Russia as the protector of the pan-Slavism idea, has pursued this agenda in the region by using armed gangs and religious clerics as instruments of aggression against both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian states. This tradition has now been formalized within the framework of the political platform of the “Serbian world.”
We are asked to be more obedient or more pragmatic
Many had expected that the removal of the political class with wartime origins, which, according to public perception and aided by the silence of the international community, would significantly alter the stance of international actors towards Kosovo. Expectations were high from all sides. However, within a few months, the EU showed resistance to any ‘unilateral’ action by the Government of Kosovo. It started with the issue of license plates, continued with the Serbian dinar, and culminated with the Serbian bridge, just a few meters away from the place where, in 1903, a conflict erupted between Albanians and the Russian consul, who had a Serbian agenda, as a result of efforts to extend Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian, and Serbian influence.
Observing the unified response of Western diplomats and international decision-making centers against the actions of the Kurti Government in the north, including the closure of Serbia’s illegal institutions operating within Kosovo’s territory, it creates the impression that Kosovo has entered a ‘stalemate’ from which it cannot move without the approval of the QUINT countries and Belgrade’s consent. The international commitment and determination are evident: the north of the country must not, under any circumstances, be controlled by Kosovo’s authorities, as the presence of the Kosova state appears unjust to a historically privileged community—or at least, this is what they are led to believe by Belgrade. The situation at the Ujëbardh (Ibër) bridge, ongoing since June 1999, is not a coincidence but stems from secret American-Russian negotiations in Moscow, which concluded on June 18 in Helsinki, mediated by Martti Ahtisaari. It is true that Russia did not succeed in obtaining a special military sector in northern Kosovo, thereby preventing the de facto partition of the country. However, the details of the rest of the agreement remain unknown, and perhaps we may never know them. What is certain is that Mitrovica was formally divided by the Ahtisaari Plan, and the roots of the Association (of Serbian municipalities) can be traced back to Ambassador Kai Eide’s report. It may not be an official international agreement, but various indicators suggest that such a line of internal division was shaped by the Helsinki Agreement of June 18, 1999. Perhaps it wasn’t even a compromise reached in Helsinki, but the placement of KFOR over the Mitrovica bridge and the tolerance of Serbia’s state security controlling the north from the post-war period until today have, in effect, legitimized a reality (cantonization) that has been quietly understood by international decision-making centers. Thus, the Mitrovica bridge neither signifies a weakness nor a lack of seriousness on the part of the West; rather, it represents a deliberate stance, one which they either do not disclose openly or keep hidden from us.
Furthermore, the messages from international actors to the Kurti Government, warning that its ‘unilateral’ actions—such as the closure of Serbia’s illegal structures within the territory of the Republic of Kosovo—seriously harm Kosovo’s relations with international partners, should be a major concern for the entire Kosovan political elite. This issue is not about the rights of local Serbs, but rather about Serbia’s assertion of state-like prerogatives within Kosovo. This international discourse legitimizes Serbia’s principle of viewing everything in Kosovo as temporary and, at the same time, reinforces Belgrade’s aggressive propaganda of Serbian self-victimization, including the narrative of a ‘humanitarian crisis’ supposedly caused by the suspension of the Serbian dinar. In reality, this is more about preserving a symbol of Serbia’s presence in Kosovo.
So, if the international community, particularly our partners, classifies the decision of the Government of Kosovo to close Serbian post offices and shut down illegal municipalities in the north as a ‘unilateral action’ (EU) or calls it a ‘provocative action’ (O’Brien), this suggests that their operations over the past 25 years were conducted with their approval, not out of sensitivity to the situation or concern for the risk of regional conflict. Naturally, this discourse is a bad omen for the new government that will emerge from the elections on February 9, 2025. Furthermore, with this approach and the form of dialogue in Brussels, where entirely unimaginable demands are being made, we must now be aware and prepared for the day when the international community might tell us that, after three decades, the conditions have developed such that, based on Annex 2, Article 6 of Resolution 1244, the time has come for a certain number of Serbian military and police personnel to have a presence near Serbian heritage sites in Kosovo. Serbia and Russia have consistently made it clear that they are working to achieve ‘a solution for Kosovo based on Resolution 1244 of the Security Council.’ On the other hand, we may react and accuse one another of national treason, but the international community is creative: they will remind us, as they often do, that KFOR’s mandate is in accordance with Resolution 1244, and that through point 12 of the Declaration of Independence (February 17, 2008), Kosovo committed itself to act in compliance with the principles of international law and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, including Resolution 1244 (1999).
Ultimately, we all know that diplomacy and politicians are not guided by moral principles but by geopolitical considerations when addressing a particular issue, especially when aiming to achieve regional balance. Given this, and it certainly is the case, it is essential to avoid a confrontational discourse that could leave us on the losing side, allowing Serbia’s demands, along with those of its allies, for the creation of an autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo to be legitimized as a punitive measure. This could serve as a transitional step toward the dysfunctionality of the Kosova state, followed by the granting of a new privileged status to the Serbian Orthodox Church, going beyond the provisions guaranteed by the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Plan.
Furthermore, in this delicate situation, the political class of Kosovo, both in power and in opposition, must demonstrate a state-centric approach that transcends any momentary party interests or gains, especially as it should not yield to the interests related to the upcoming national elections, which are scheduled for early February of next year.
Moreover, the citizens of Kosovo have the right to seek greater clarity from both the Government of Kosovo and the international decision-making centers. It should be made clear what is being demanded of Kosovars; it should be stated unequivocally how many and what compromises are being requested from us, or what rights are lacking for local Serbs. If someone is calling for the return of Serbia to Kosovo, then it must be made clear that this is a historical issue. At the same time, from the Albanian side, those who communicate with international partners must convey the truth about what the international community expects from us, as it appears that someone, perhaps one party, is hiding the truth, or that the citizens of Kosovo are not interpreting the political message correctly within the new geopolitical context.
Consequently, Kosovo needs more clarity: if the actions of the Kurti government are indeed unilateral, then the citizens of Kosovo are willing to be patient—one, two, three, or more years—since we have already been waiting for 25 years. In fact, we, the Albanians of Kosovo, have been paying for the electricity consumed by the Serbs in the north for 25 years, as they refuse to do so.
Absence
We, too, seek to understand what the recent international demands regarding Kosovo mean when they state that ‘there can be no normalization without new compromises.’ Seventeen years ago, when we accepted the Ahtisaari Package, we were congratulated from all corners of the world for demonstrating generosity and making painful compromises by offering favors to the Serbian community and special guarantees for their cultural and religious heritage. It is also true that Kosovo has an obligation to form the Association of Municipalities with a Serbian Majority, while Serbia is obliged to recognize Kosovo’s statehood. However, if the EU has since abandoned the inclusive and legally binding agreement, implying that Serbia may now be required to recognize Kosovo’s independence, this situation complicates not only the issue of the Association but also the Brussels Process itself, which has been at a standstill for years.
Ambiguity in many questions
In the current situation, where every action taken by the Government of Kosovo to dismantle the Serbian state structures operating illegally in Kosovo is contested by the international community (EU and the USA) and labeled as unilateral, the perception among the public in Kosovo is forming that the international community is resolutely pursuing an agenda for the internal division of Kosovo, similar to the model of Bosnia. Naturally, a troubling sign of this is the asymmetrical approach of the EU, specifically the recent decision of the European Union Council (July 2024) to recognize Serbian passports issued by the Coordinating Directorate of Serbia for Serbian citizens of Kosovo, with the cities of Kosovo listed as territory of the Republic of Serbia! You cannot find a similar case in the world where two states that do not recognize each other simultaneously issue passports for the same citizens. How would such a situation appear in the EU, for example, if Germany were to issue passports for Germans in Belgium, marking their Belgian residences as territory of the German state?! This decision is more than regrettable! In terms of international law, there is only one interpretation: it constitutes a violation of the state sovereignty of a nation.
This discourse from the EU has shaken the trust of the Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, they want to know how Brussels perceives and treats us: as a European state, as a region with an unresolved status, or merely as a territory with cultural and religious remnants of Eastern provenance? The case of Bosnia illustrates why the West, in the face of a unified Muslim state in the heart of Europe, has allowed the notion that ‘it is better to tolerate a violent political project, albeit Christian, which has brought wars and bloodshed, as a counterbalance to the creation of strong Muslim entities in Europe’ (Nevenka Tromp). This is the ‘Green Transversal’ promoted by Milosevic’s regime, for which we find materials in the archives of the Hague Tribunal’s judicial process, as well as similar statements in a joint article by Ivica Dacic and Sergey Lavrov (‘The Kosovo Knot: Is a Fair Solution Possible?’, 18-06-2020), published in Russian, French, Chinese, Spanish, and Brazilian Portuguese on the website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘The widespread presence of criminal elements in Kosovo linked to Middle Eastern terrorist groups, primarily from Syria, as well as criminal gangs in the Balkans and other parts of Europe, means that this region, with its history and cultural heritage, is becoming a haven for thieves and criminals of all kinds,’ Dacic and Lavrov assert.
Kosovo is fatigued not only from the long and brutal internal conflict but also from the ongoing international pressure in the Brussels Process. It has often fallen victim to the traps set by various emissaries aimed at discrediting the political elite, with the intention of exhausting Kosovo. Through a strategy of buying time, they open the way for new concessions and compromises in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. It is hard to believe that it is merely a coincidence that the decision to resume the Brussels dialogue coincided with the conspiratorial project of Swiss Senator Dick Marty regarding ‘organ trafficking,’ which has since been dismantled, but its consequences remain. Today, we have a Tribunal that only prosecutes Albanians. Naturally, the comparison is flawed, but if this logic were to be followed, it would imply that after World War II, at Nuremberg, former American President Harry Truman should have been tried for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the bombing of Dresden.
Almost everyone applauded the need for justice to be served: that the “black mark” over Kosovo should be removed, even though Kosovo, unlike any other country in the former Yugoslavia, had been continuously judged by six courts: UNMIK (UNO), EULEX (EU), Kosovo, and Serbia.
Even today, just as in the 1980s when Milosevic came to power, the theory of Serbian victimization is being promoted as a strategy to convince us that this historically privileged community has reasons to live separately and outside the state system of Kosovo. This battle did not begin today or yesterday; it started on June 10, 1999, when Serbia, along with its allies, launched a campaign to overturn the truth about what had happened in Kosovo between 1989 and 1999. This was a well-known attempt to revise the narrative and exhaust international public opinion regarding Kosovo. In this sense, unfortunately, Kosovo is currently not fashionable!
