By Arash Toupchinejad*
Serbia recently found itself in a perilous standoff with Kosovo this past December when ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo established roadblocks to protest the arrest of a former Kosovo Serb police officer who had assaulted serving police officers. In response to this provocation, Kosovo called upon NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping forces to intercede, while Serbia placed its military on the highest level of combat readiness. Through negotiations and menial assurances, tensions have simmered slightly, and protestors recently cleared the barricades they erected along the main border crossing between Serbia and Kosovo.
This incident was far from the first time Serbia and Kosovo have risked a return to open conflict in the Balkans. Cross-border animosity has risen since Kosovo’s government increased efforts to assert its sovereignty, demanding that all citizens, including ethnic Serbs, carry identification documents and use Kosovo-issued licence plates. This initiative sparked protests among Kosovo’s ethnic Serb population, which heightened tensions between the neighboring countries. While Belgrade and Pristina eventually reached a compromise over identification documents, other points of disagreement remain unresolved, with the root cause of the chronic tensions being Kosovo’s independence. While 117 countries have recognized Kosovo since its independence in 2008, Serbia has never accepted its secession. The European Union has thus far conserved a modus vivendi between the two states. But as Kosovo attempts to assert its sovereignty and Serbia incites unrest among the ethnic Serb minority, the chances of a cross-border conflict remain high.
As the war in Ukraine dominates headlines and global attention, renewed tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have remained in the shadows. But external actors may capitalize on this lingering contention to destabilize an already volatile region. Russia may try to exert pressure on the West by orchestrating a new conflict in Eastern Europe, leveraging its close relationship with Serbia and the growing anti-West sentiment among Serbs to distract the world from its prolonged invasion of Ukraine.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister Kurti is among those concerned with Russia’s alleged interest in inciting tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Kurti suggested that Russia, which has suffered over 100,000 casualties in its war, may be interested in igniting another war in continental Europe vis-à-vis Serbia to overturn its impasse in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s recent partial mobilization failed to produce its intended results, and its forces now face equipment and ammunition shortages. Additionally, the West’s focus remains firmly fixed on Ukraine despite concerns over energy prices, looming recessions, and other domestic issues. Central NATO members continue to bankroll Ukraine’s war effort as the United States Congress approved President Biden’s recently proposed $45 billion aid package to Kyiv, bringing the total US aid to nearly $100 billion. As such, Russian President Vladimir Putin would benefit from diverting attention away from Ukraine by fueling a diplomatic quagmire in the Balkans.
Russia has long been one of Serbia’s foremost political proponents, and its fallout with Kosovo is no exception. Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and has regarded NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia as a violation of international order. Additionally, Putin is also signalling his pro-Serb proclivities by sponsoring Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, who has threatened to secede Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Russia and Serbia share a deep-rooted sociocultural bond, anchored in their Eastern Orthodox heritage and the concept of a pan-Slavic civilization. This cultural link has become increasingly evident as Russia holds significant sway in Belgrade due to its popularity among ethnic Serbs. A survey conducted in Serbia by the Demostat Research Centre last June showed that 80% of respondents opposed sanctions on Russia and 66% believed that NATO was responsible for war in Ukraine, while only 11% blamed Russia. In another recent poll, 72% of Serbs viewed Russia’s influence on their country as positive. The Kremlin has also deployed its media outlets to stir civil discontent against Pristina among Kosovo Serbs. This support is reciprocated by pro-government Serbian outlets that promote the Russian narrative of the Ukraine war.
In recent years, Russia and Serbia have also solidified their military ties. Since 2014, Serbia has relied on Russia for its rearmament effort, becoming a notable buyer of Russian drones and defensive weapons. Over the past year, the Kremlin has supplied Belgrade with Mig-29 fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and its advanced Pantsir missile system. Serbia has also filled a pivotal role in joint military exercises with Russia. Similarly, Russia has developed a more direct militaristic presence in Serbia via the infamous Wagner Group, which formally launched “influence operations” to counterbalance anti-Putin rhetoric from the Russian diaspora in Serbia. The proximity of Russian troops in the Donbas and along the Belarussian border, and Moscow no longer being in a position to seek rapprochement with the West, could embolden Belgrade to exacerbate tensions with Kosovo into open hostilities, assured of the Kremlin’s steadfast support.
Moscow may also be able to persuade Belgrade to deploy hard power tactics to curtail Kosovo’s sovereignty, given Serbia’s strong economic ties with Russia. Serbia’s energy sector is closely linked to Russia, having granted Gazprom a majority stake in its national oil company. Today, Serbia relies on Russia for around 85% of its gas, providing Moscow leverage over its energy sector. Another source of economic dependence is the recent surge in Russian-owned enterprises migrating to Serbia since the Ukraine war started. Russia is among Serbia’s top five trading partners, with bilateral trade steadily rising since Belgrade signed a free trade agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2019. Exports are expected to increase further as Russia looks for alternative trading partners to bypass EU sanctions. President Vucic recently risked tensions with Brussels by refusing to align with EU sanctions against Russia. Thus, the economic interdependence with Russia has seemingly influenced Belgrade’s political decision-making over the past year, and it may continue to have a significant bearing on Serbia and Russia’s geopolitical interests.
Despite Serbia’s amicable relations with Russia, the country’s position towards Moscow is not always supportive. For example, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Serbia voted in favor of UN resolutions that condemned Russian aggression and rejected the annexation of Ukrainian territory. President Vucic also recently demanded Russia to end recruitment of Serbians for the Ukraine war. Therefore, Serbia’s approach to foreign policy is multi-dimensional. The country has sought to balance its foreign policy between the US and its European allies and non-Western actors like Russia to sustain its tendentious non-alignment in an increasingly multi-polar world. As such, Belgrade’s relationship with Russia and the West is characterized by a level of tactical maneuvering, with the country warming up to whichever side can prove the most generous benefactor of Serbia’s proclaimed raison d’état in the Balkans.
Despite its balanced foreign policy, Serbia’s diplomatic attitude towards the US and EU has indeed deteriorated in recent months, primarily due to the Kosovo question. Pristina has been firmly pro-Western and views near-term NATO membership and EU accession as viable guarantees of its sovereignty. Thus, Washington and Brussels have pressured President Vucic to recognize Kosovo and demanded safeguards for its border integrity, which has, in turn, contributed to growing anti-West rhetoric in Serbia. While Serbia continues to pursue negotiations for its own EU accession, the majority of Serbians have recently expressed opposition to EU membership, with only 35% in support, according to a recent poll by Ipsos.
Ultimately, the renewed tensions between Serbia and Kosovo may crescendo at an uncertain time when the US and its European allies find it challenging to reprimand Belgrade if it instigates a conflict with Kosovo. As they face war fatigue, NATO members may fail to persuade their citizens to direct additional resources to Kosovo while upholding support for Ukraine. The West’s potential inaction is not unlikely, given the rise in global conflicts over the past two years. Aside from the Russo-Ukrainian war, the international community has witnessed armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ethiopia, the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, and close calls between China and Taiwan. In many of these conflicts, the US and EU have remained primarily on the sidelines.
But there are also unequivocal ramifications of renewed war in the Balkans, a region comprising Europe’s most volatile cleft countries. A minor conflict with Kosovo may easily spill over into neighboring countries, given the various unresolved irredentist sentiments and complex ethnic ties between states like Kosovo and Albania. Reminiscent of the exceptionally bloody Yugoslav wars, the loss of human life and economic cost could pose too significant a risk for Serbia to consider attacking Kosovo now. Belgrade would also have to consider giving up its balanced foreign policy as being the aggressor against Kosovo would isolate Serbia from Europe and indefinitely postpone its EU accession. Therefore, the Serbia-Kosovo border calls for closer observation this year, as the possibility of renewed conflict between the two states hints at significant implications for Europe and the rest of the world.
* Arash Toupchinejad is a Junior Research Fellow at the NATO Association of Canada and an MSF Graduate from Georgetown University. He is also a columnist for the European Student Think Tank and has written articles for The National Interest, The Hill Times, and other publications. His research spans the impact of geoeconomics and geopolitics on foreign affairs, as well as the history and politics of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
