by Agron Vrangalla
Tirana Times, 08 February 2026 – Moscow systematically uses information manipulation as an instrument of foreign policy. In North Macedonia, Russian propaganda relies on several recurring narratives that exploit domestic political tensions and social vulnerabilities.
The impact of Russian propaganda in the Western Balkans is neither new nor unfamiliar. For years, European institutions and civil society organizations have warned about Moscow’s destabilizing role in the region, particularly in countries aspiring to membership in the European Union. North Macedonia, a NATO member since 2020 and an EU candidate country, is not exempt from this dynamic, similar to other Western Balkan states, with Serbia being the most prominent example.
In this context, recent political developments in Skopje have increased concerns regarding the country’s Euro-integration path. The current government and Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski have shown limited willingness to accelerate key reforms, particularly constitutional amendments, despite promises made during the election campaign. The pledge that these changes would be adopted within six months of assuming office remains unfulfilled.
Constitutional amendments
On January 29, Prime Minister Mickoski was categorical: “There will be no constitutional changes as long as I am prime minister, unless at least two conditions are met,” he stated, referring to the issue of the rights of the Macedonian community in Bulgaria and guarantees that there would be “no bilateral vetoes, humiliation, or degradation based on subjective reasons.”
According to political scientist Murat Aliu, professor at Mother Teresa University in Skopje, the delay in constitutional amendments reflects domestic political dynamics more than direct Russian influence. However, the geopolitical consequences are unavoidable.
“Any delay in constitutional amendments also means postponing the country’s accession process to the European Union. And the further away the EU membership perspective is, the greater the space becomes for the influence of third actors, including Russia. In this sense, Russian influence is not necessarily the cause of the blockage, but its beneficiary,” Aliu emphasizes.
When influence is accepted from within
A key element often overlooked in analyses of foreign influence is the fact that propaganda cannot function without receptive ground. No external power can impose its influence without segments of society or local elites being willing to accept it. Influence is not a military occupation, but a voluntary relationship between those who offer a narrative and those who embrace it.
In the Western Balkans, accumulated frustration with long, conditional integration processes has created space for alternative discourses. This is where the Russian narrative finds its entry point.
The West as a problem, Russia as an alternative
Moscow has systematically used information manipulation as a tool of foreign policy. Known as “information warfare” or “foreign information manipulation and interference,” this approach goes beyond traditional diplomacy, targeting emotions, identity, and societal insecurities. Some experts view this as a form of hybrid warfare, where information is used as an instrument of political and social influence.
In North Macedonia, Russian propaganda is built around several repeated narratives: Russia is presented as a defender of traditional values, Orthodox identity, and pan-Slavism, while the West is portrayed as a “liberal” force that imposes conditions and undermines national identity. The change of the country’s name, demands for constitutional amendments, and the protection of minority rights are often framed as “humiliations” imposed by the EU.
According to Petrit Saraçini from the Institute for Media and Analytics, religious and traditional sentiments are a crucial instrument in this influence strategy. “Church structures and so-called civic initiatives are used as intermediary channels to nurture narratives against the ‘degenerate’ West,” Saraçini says.
Local politics and problematic alliances
Pro-Russian narratives are not confined to the media. They also resonate within domestic politics. Parties such as Levica have openly expressed anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, while groups like “United Macedonia,” led by Janko Baçev, promote closer ties with Russia and reject Euro-Atlantic integration.
Within the executive branch, there are also figures known for close links with Moscow. Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Stoilković, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbs, has participated in Russian security forums where he promoted bilateral cooperation.
These concerns were also reflected in the European Parliament report of June 26, 2025. Rapporteur Thomas Waitz warned about the influence of the so-called “Serbian World” concept, supported by government representatives and closely linked to Russian and Chinese interests in the region.
Media, social networks, and disinformation
Research shows that Russian propaganda spreads mainly through media outlets that rebroadcast content from Sputnik Serbia, RT Serbia, and Serbian tabloids, which are then adapted for the Macedonian audience. Social media platforms act as amplifiers of these narratives.
“Facebook, X, and Telegram are particularly used by the Russian embassy in Skopje and reinforced by bot farms to spread disinformation, especially regarding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and so-called ‘traditional values’,” Saraçini notes.
The goal is not the complete domination of public discourse, but the fragmentation of informational reality, the creation of confusion, and the weakening of trust in democracy.
Consequences and the need for response
Although Russian influence in North Macedonia is not currently dominant, it represents a real risk. Propaganda creates illusions, fuels ethnic and religious polarization, undermines trust in institutions, and slows Euro-integration processes.
Addressing this phenomenon requires professional media, institutional transparency, media literacy, and legal regulation of media ownership and financing. Combating disinformation is not censorship, but the protection of the public sphere from the abuse of freedom of expression.
Ultimately, the choice remains political and societal: Europe as a project of reforms and standards, or the illusion of an alternative that offers neither development nor security.
This analysis was prepared within the framework of the project “Resilience Against Disinformation in North Macedonia,” supported by the government of the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW).
The post Russian Propaganda in North Macedonia appeared first on Tirana Times.
