In late August 2022, Montenegro’s government digital infrastructure was hit by what officials called an “unprecedented” cyberattack. The disruption was serious enough that parts of the public sector had to fall back on manual workarounds while authorities tried to isolate affected systems. In a region where state capacity is often tested in real time, for example by crises, polarization and outside interference, this was a blunt reminder of how pressure now works in Europe: not only through military threats, but through the quiet sabotage of networks that keep governments and economies functioning.
Montenegro’s most important response did not come in the form of a statement. It came as rehearsal. In early June 2025, the country hosted a major cyber defense exercise under “Immediate Response 25,” bringing together Montenegrin teams, specialists from North Macedonia and U.S. National Guard personnel. The point was operational: practice incident reporting, test how information moves between institutions and train for recovery under pressure. That may sound technical, but it is exactly the difference between a state that absorbs shocks and one that spirals into paralysis.
This shift from improvising in crisis to practicing in advance captures how NATO is institutionalizing stability. At the NATO Summit in The Hague on 24-25 June 2025, Allies agreed to a long-term investment path designed to make deterrence and resilience more credible over time. The commitment is framed as 5% of GDP by 2035, split into two lanes: at least 3.5% for core defense requirements and capability targets and up to 1.5% for defense‑ and security‑related spending, including resilience, critical infrastructure and cyber. Allies also agreed to submit annual plans charting a credible path, with progress reviewed in 2029.
It is also worth being frank: the politics around the pledge were not seamless. Some Allies signaled that they could meet capability commitments without adhering strictly to the 5 percent target, citing domestic trade-offs. That tension underscores a basic reality of NATO. However, by converting the target into a performance contract, the Alliance introduced a simple test: show year by year that the forces you field, the stocks you hold and the resilience you hard-wire match the threat environment. That move did three things at once. First, it neutralized domestic criticism that the 5 percent rule was an “accounting trick” detached from real capability. Second, it kept the peer-pressure mechanism alive: a public review in 2029 will still expose how every Ally performs. Third, it signalled to adversaries that output, not appearances, is what counts.
Why this matters in the Western Balkans
In the Western Balkans, security is judged by delivery, not declarations. NATO’s annual national plans and the 2029 review force governments to show progress in real time, raising the political cost of falling short. The impact is visible in field drills such as EUFOR’s Quick Response 25, where Bosnian troops and a KFOR reserve battalion rehearsed joint movements: the exercise tested whether command links worked, corridors stayed open and host-nation services arrived on time under pressure
Geography amplifies the stakes. Straddling Adriatic ports, regional airfields and inland routes, the Western Balkans is a logistical hinge on NATO’s south-eastern flank; regular pressure tests reveal weak spots early and fix them before an adversary can exploit the gap, tightening deterrence and reducing the margin for miscalculation
Resilience is not a buzzword, it is an operating requirement
NATO’s focus on resilience also has a direct development payoff for the Western Balkans. Article 3 frames civil preparedness around continuity of government, essential services, and civil support to military operations. In other words, whether the state still functions when it is being pushed. Markets notice the difference: when administration breaks down, costs rise fast through disrupted customs, delayed logistics, reputational damage and capital flight. When continuity is proven in practice, including testing cyber response, hardening infrastructure and assuring reliable crisis logistics, uncertainty falls, and that improves the baseline conditions for investment and public confidence.
Albania offers an example of how “security” and “development” converge in the real economy. During the NATO Summit in The Hague, Prime Minister Edi Rama met NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and discussed the New Port of Durrës, including NATO support for developing a military terminal there. Dual‑use infrastructure is often discussed in general terms, but its logic is straightforward: ports, rail links and energy nodes that can support allied mobility can also improve commercial throughput and regional connectivity. The same upgrades that enable faster reinforcement, for example clear routes, dependable logistics, secure communications, also reduce friction for trade and crisis supply chains.
But the development dividend is not automatic. Large defense and infrastructure budgets can strengthen governance or they can become magnets for rent‑seeking and strategic corruption. In a region where trust in institutions remains fragile, procurement integrity is not a technical footnote, but a security requirement. Corruption does not only waste money. It creates leverage, feeds polarizations and hands external actors an easy narrative: that reforms are more of a facade and the state serves private interests.
That is why the most strategic move for Western Balkan governments is to connect the NATO and EU tracks instead of treating them as separate universes. The European Commission’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is explicitly designed to bring earlier benefits through closer integration with the EU single market. It is backed by a proposed €6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for 2024-2027, with disbursements linked to reforms. Projects that meet both NATO resilience needs and EU connectivity and rule‑of‑law standards can attract broader financing and, crucially, produce results citizens can feel before formal accession.
The real anchor is implementation
If there is one takeaway from The Hague, it is that stability is being pushed from rhetoric toward verification. NATO’s 2025 approach tries to make deterrence measurable: annual plans that can be compared, a 2029 review that can expose gaps, and an explicit lane for cyber and infrastructure resilience. In that model, the question is not whether countries declare alignment, but whether they can demonstrate readiness through tested procedures, credible procurement and institutions that keep functioning under pressure.
That is also the standard the public should apply. Stability is not a badge, it is performance. And performance leaves traces: budgets that match plans, exercises that test real routes and administrations that can take a hit without shutting down.
This article was produced under the project “After the Hague Summit: NATO’s steadfast commitment to defence and deterrence,” implemented by the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) with the support of the Public Diplomacy Division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The content is the sole responsibility of AIIS and does not necessarily reflect the views of NATO.
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