By Veton Surroi
Tirana Times, October 26, 2026.
Seven Points Following The Elections in Serbia
1.
The Student Movement in Serbia, which won the parliamentary elections and paved the way for the end of the fourteen-year rule of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the autocrat Aleksandar Vučić, is a heterogeneous movement that, from a historical perspective, bears a distant resemblance to the movements that brought down communism in Central and Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Within this movement, as in those of 1989–1990, there are major ideological differences, but one common idea: the establishment of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law.
2.
The Student Movement (or, more precisely, the Student List) is thus a successful revolutionary-electoral movement, built through a capillary structure, with broad mobilization and still without an identifiable leader or leadership.
This movement managed to sustain two years of resistance through civil disobedience against a regime that had captured the state. The discipline of this capillary movement has withstood attacks from the regime and criticism from the democratic public.
Its capillary nature, heterogeneity, and lack of identifiable leadership are now challenges for a movement that has won a mandate to govern.
With the Student List, Serbia is entering three transitions simultaneously: the transition from a captured state to a democratic state; the transition from a resistance movement to functioning government; and the transition from the heterogeneity of resistance to a political structure capable of articulating policies of governance.
3.
The Student List carries an additional historical burden compared with the movements of 1989–1990: the tragic legacy of post-communism in Serbia.
Today’s winners of power inherit more than three decades of a toxic Serbia, nourished by the idea of Serbian supremacism, the consequences of the wars that led to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, and the connections between political power, nationalist clergy, and organized crime.
The students who led this impressive two-year movement grew up amid the consequences of wars and politically unresolved conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as identity-related tensions with Montenegro. Their movement has yet to articulate a critical distancing from Serbian policies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
4.
From its very first day, the new government, with all its organizational fragility, will face national security challenges.
As the two years of student resistance have shown, the previous government relied on party-personal control of the security structures and their intertwining with organized crime.
Dismantling such an octopus is a major and existential challenge for any government seeking to democratize Serbia, as demonstrated by the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić.
Serbia already experienced in 2000 that the overthrow of a ruler does not in itself mean the dismantling of the system of rule.
5.
Although the Student List did not openly declare itself a pro-European force, Serbia may be closer to the European Union today than it was yesterday.
Three tests will show whether this possibility will turn into a state orientation.
The first is success in dismantling the levers of the captured state, particularly severing the links between the security structures (primarily the intelligence services) and organized crime.
The second is the creation of a new foreign and security policy that views the Western Balkans and Europe as a space of common security, rather than a zone of competition for influence among non-European actors.
6.
The third test is Kosovo.
It is difficult to expect relations with Kosovo to rise immediately to the top of the new government’s priorities. Nevertheless, relations with Kosovo will face their first test precisely during the dismantling of the captured state.
In dismantling the captured state and its connections with organized crime, figures such as Milan Radoičić and the Veselinović brothers—figures who implemented Vučić’s policies in Kosovo—will come to the forefront of priorities.
The first challenge for the new government in relations with Kosovo may be bringing Milan Radoičić to justice, including handing him over to the Kosovo authorities for the attack in Banjska.
Radoičić was the leader of the paramilitary group that carried out the attack in Banjska. Uncovering the state support for this operation will be an indispensable part of dismantling Vučić’s system.
7.
In the medium term, and if it succeeds in strengthening itself, the new government in Serbia will face a historic opportunity in relations with Kosovo.
Throughout his rule, Vučić tried a series of approaches to keep the dispute with Kosovo open.
In cooperation with Kosovo’s leaders, he tried to maintain the “parallel structures” as an extension of Serbia’s authority; he tried to turn the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities into the nucleus of a Republika Srpska within Kosovo; he tried the territorial partition of Kosovo; and, finally, he tried a paramilitary attack.
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About the author
Veton Surroi is a Kosovar Albanian author , publicist, politician and former journalist. He was a member of the Kosovo delegation at the Rambouillet peace negotiations in 1999. He served as a member of the Kosovo Assembly from 2004 to 2008.
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