TIRANA TIMES, March 19, 2026 – The European Union’s enlargement debate has entered a new and unusually sensitive phase. What initially appeared to be a Brussels-driven discussion about how to accelerate Ukraine’s accession has quickly evolved into a broader political reckoning inside key member states over the future shape, pace, and political purpose of enlargement itself.
A recent policy brief shows that the real battleground is no longer only the European Commission’s reform ideas, but the internal calculations of major member states such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The central conclusion is clear: while diplomats in these capitals are increasingly aware that enlargement must now be understood through a geopolitical lens, their political leaders remain cautious, domestically constrained, and still far from a common strategic line.
At stake is not only Ukraine’s European future, but also whether countries such as Montenegro and Albania , the Western Balkans’ current frontrunners , can still benefit from a realistic enlargement window before domestic politics inside the EU turns more hostile again.
Enlargement at a crossroads
The current debate was triggered by the European Commission’s effort to rethink accession amid the war in Ukraine and a wider geopolitical sense of urgency. One of the ideas floated in Brussels was a form of “reverse enlargement” or phased entry: allowing Ukraine to enter the EU formally first, while conditioning the full exercise of membership rights on reforms being completed later.
That option, however, ran into resistance from member states. EU ambassadors reportedly rejected it on March 4 and asked the Commission to propose a more realistic way forward. That rejection did not end the reform debate, but it shifted attention back to the more traditional accession model.
Under that model, the analysis argues, the EU should now focus far more seriously on Montenegro and Albania. Both have made significant progress and now stand a realistic chance of completing negotiations between 2027 and 2028. Montenegro has already closed almost half of its negotiating chapters, and in December 2025 member states even proposed beginning work on its accession treaty. That alone is significant: the EU has not concluded an accession treaty since Croatia’s, fifteen years ago.
Yet this also raises new challenges. The next generation of accession treaties will likely need stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, especially in rule of law commitments. Montenegro’s treaty, according to the analysis, could serve as the template for future accessions.
The broader point is that enlargement is no longer merely a technical process. In a Europe defined by war, instability and renewed great-power rivalry, enlargement is increasingly being treated as a strategic instrument for security, stability, and geopolitical relevance.
Germany: moving, but still cautiously
In Berlin, enlargement is no longer an afterthought, but it is not yet a full political priority either. Germany’s position is one of gradual awakening. Until recently, Berlin largely adopted a passive, wait-and-see approach. That is now changing, especially within institutional circles such as the Foreign Office, the Chancellery and the Bundestag, where more serious strategic thinking is underway.
German officials increasingly accept that enlargement must be viewed through “geopolitical logic.” At the same time, Berlin remains deeply attached to the Copenhagen criteria and merit-based conditionality, above all on rule of law. This tension lies at the heart of Germany’s current dilemma: how to respond to the geopolitical imperative of supporting Ukraine without abandoning the principle that accession must be earned.
For now, Berlin appears more open to innovation inside the framework than to a dramatic rupture with it. That means support for mechanisms of gradual integration that give candidates more substance and benefits before full accession, while preserving membership itself as the final goal.
Still, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has not yet fully embraced enlargement as a major political file. His engagement has been limited and sporadic, though he has openly voiced discomfort with the current approach and said the EU needs a revived strategy to bring the Western Balkans closer until they eventually become members.
Domestic politics, however, complicate Germany’s room for maneuver. The enlargement file is firmly controlled by the CDU, which now holds both the chancellorship and foreign ministry. The CSU, the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, is more skeptical and insists on internal EU reform and budgetary impact assessments before any major new accession steps. At the same time, regional elections in 2026 and the rise of the far-right AfD could raise the political cost of enlargement decisions.
Germany’s hierarchy of candidates
The study shows that Germany’s preferences among candidate states are becoming increasingly differentiated.
On Ukraine, Berlin remains the country’s largest European backer in military, financial and humanitarian terms. But its primary focus has been Ukraine’s short-term survival, not its rapid EU entry. This helps explain why Berlin reacted with caution rather than enthusiasm to the Commission’s push for accession reform. Merz reportedly rejected President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 2027 accession target outright, while Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul is said to oppose a sui generis approach for Ukraine, preferring instead a package that could include Montenegro, Albania and possibly Iceland.
Germany also insists that enlargement cannot be separated from internal EU reform. Berlin criticizes Brussels for focusing too narrowly on enlargement without giving enough weight to the institutional and policy consequences inside the Union.
As for the Western Balkans, Germany sees Montenegro as the clearest low-cost success story — a candidate whose progress could inject momentum into the entire region. Albania is viewed somewhat more cautiously. Berlin is waiting for a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report and is more demanding than some other member states when it comes to corruption and rule of law.
Germany also wants to avoid fully closing the door on Serbia. Berlin’s conservatives still believe the broader success of Western Balkans integration is linked to the accession of the region’s largest country. But Serbia’s democratic backsliding, its harsh treatment of student protesters, and its continued ties to Russia made any upgrade of Belgrade’s accession track politically difficult for Berlin in 2025.
Iceland, meanwhile, is increasingly discussed in Berlin as another attractive candidate because it is already inside the single market and Schengen area. Its possible accession reinforces a distinctly German instinct: advance first with the easiest and least disruptive cases before confronting more difficult files such as Ukraine, Moldova, or North Macedonia.
The Netherlands: geopolitically aware, politically hesitant
The Netherlands presents a different picture. The new Dutch minority government, installed in February 2026, has adopted an explicitly geopolitical language on Europe and enlargement. Its coalition agreement says the Netherlands should be a driving force behind a strong and decisive EU, and enlargement is mentioned prominently in that framework.
But Dutch political reality remains far more constrained. The coalition holds only 66 of 150 parliamentary seats, which means it depends constantly on opposition support. In Dutch politics, enlargement has long been vulnerable to becoming a bargaining chip in wider negotiations, and the minority format makes that even more likely.
The new government says it wants to approach enlargement both “realistically” and “geopolitically,” but with full continued adherence to Copenhagen criteria, including strict rule of law conditions for Ukraine. It also speaks positively of a multi-speed Europe, though the exact meaning of that remains vague.
Thinking in the Netherlands on fast-track accession or major methodological overhaul is still at a very early stage. Even though Prime Minister Rob Jetten had previously supported a motion for fast-tracked Ukrainian accession when he was D66 party leader, that idea was rejected by parliament and exposed clear divisions even among today’s coalition partners.
Recent debates in parliament have remained rooted in traditional conditionality. For Albania and Montenegro, Dutch majorities have so far accepted reform progress and agreed to opening clusters or closing chapters. But the Netherlands’ real position will only become clear when these countries finish negotiations and actual decisions on accession must be taken.
Public opinion and the Dutch paradox
Public opinion in the Netherlands is not as negative as its political caution might suggest. A 2025 Eurobarometer found that 69 percent of Dutch citizens are at least somewhat favorable to enlargement, placing the country ninth in the EU. Yet Dutch politicians remain wary, partly because enlargement is not a salient topic in public debate and because support for Ukraine does not automatically translate into support for other candidates.
This creates a paradox. Because the issue is not actively debated, Dutch society has not fully processed either the benefits or the implications of enlargement. Unless the government engages citizens more honestly and openly, future decisions may again confront a public that feels uninformed and suddenly forced into a major geopolitical choice.
Behind the scenes, however, Dutch diplomats and advisory bodies are actively preparing scenarios, including a fast-tracked Ukrainian accession in the context of a peace settlement. In such a case, the Netherlands would likely demand strict post-accession conditionality, including suspension of major membership rights such as voting rights or full participation in EU policies if obligations were not respected.
France: strategically aware, politically ambivalent
France may ultimately prove the most difficult member state in the next phase of enlargement. Paris has moved away from its old outright reluctance, especially since President Emmanuel Macron’s 2023 speech in Bratislava, but French ambivalence has not disappeared, it has simply become more sophisticated.
Public opinion is the first constraint. Eurobarometer data show France as the least enlargement-friendly country in the EU, with only 43 percent in favor and 48 percent against. Public support for Ukraine has also declined from its 2022 peak. In the run-up to the 2027 presidential election, and under a government without a parliamentary majority, Paris is unwilling to trigger a politically volatile national debate on enlargement.
This caution is reinforced by the French state apparatus itself. The French administration remains divided. The Quai d’Orsay is often more conservative and skeptical, while the economic ministries are more open to unconventional thinking. As a result, France often speaks positively about enlargement in public while slowing it down in practice.
This duality also shapes Paris’s approach to Ukraine. France rejects “reverse enlargement,” and insists that enlargement must remain demanding and merit-based. Yet French officials also recognize that Ukraine cannot simply be left in a geopolitical gray zone exposed to Russian pressure.
France’s regional calculations
In the Western Balkans, France now appears more favorable than before to the idea that Montenegro and Albania could join by the end of the decade. It also continues to see Serbia as strategically important and too consequential to leave outside the EU indefinitely. Macron’s personal ties with President Aleksandar Vučić matter here, as do longstanding French interests in Serbia, including major commercial and defense investments.
Paris pushed to open cluster 3 with Serbia in late 2025, though without enough support among member states. This reflects a broader French strategic view: excluding Serbia carries geopolitical risks, and binding it closer to the EU may be preferable even amid democratic concerns.
France is also open to decoupling Moldova from Ukraine if Hungary continues to block Kyiv, suggesting Paris is willing to think more pragmatically about sequencing and combinations among candidates.
At the same time, France is adamant that enlargement cannot proceed without internal EU reform, or at least reform in parallel. Paris argues that adding only Montenegro and Albania would not in itself break the Union, since the EU already had 28 members before Brexit. But it believes the EU’s decision-making system is already too weak for crisis management and must be improved regardless.
The French obstacle: ratification
The biggest structural obstacle in France is ratification. Any new accession treaty must be approved either by a three-fifths majority in both chambers of parliament or by referendum. In the current climate, both paths are politically fraught.
The government would clearly prefer parliamentary ratification, but even that would be difficult given the fragmented political landscape and the rise of the far right. A referendum, meanwhile, would be even riskier. This ratification hurdle could make France the decisive bottleneck in future enlargement.
The French case also underscores the importance of public communication. In France, enlargement is closely tied to concrete fears, especially among farmers concerned about Ukraine’s possible impact on the Common Agricultural Policy. Without reassuring these constituencies, strategic arguments alone may not suffice.
The broader lesson: geopolitics is winning, but not yet politically
Across Germany, the Netherlands and France, a common pattern is emerging. Diplomatic and bureaucratic awareness of enlargement’s strategic necessity is growing. There is a broader recognition that the EU can no longer treat accession as a purely procedural or technocratic exercise. War in Ukraine, instability in Europe’s neighborhood, and uncertainty about the long-term American role have all made enlargement more urgent.
But this geopolitical logic has not yet fully translated into political leadership. National debates remain limited, public communication weak, and domestic electoral constraints strong. In all three countries, the strategic class is moving faster than elected politics.
That gap is especially consequential for the Western Balkans. While the EU’s political attention has shifted heavily toward Ukraine, Montenegro and Albania should not become collateral damage in that refocusing. On the contrary, they are the most realistic candidates to demonstrate that enlargement still works.
The message for Albania and Montenegro
For Tirana and Podgorica, one of the report’s most important messages is that they should remain inside the current accession methodology and be helped to complete it, rather than being folded into an improvised second-class arrangement.
The authors strongly warn against any model of diluted or “political” membership with extensive safeguards and limited rights. In their view, such arrangements would reward elites with symbolic seats at the EU table while offering little real benefit to citizens. For the Western Balkans, that could reduce the incentive for continued reform and undermine the credibility of enlargement itself.
Ukraine may be a different case, because even partial or politically symbolic accession could carry major value in conflict management. But for Albania and Montenegro, the better path remains full completion of the normal process, with targeted support to finish negotiations.
What the authors recommend
The report closes with a set of recommendations that together form a roadmap for the next stage of enlargement.
First, member states must now take the lead and maintain momentum. Since the Commission has already launched the debate on reform, national capitals should move it forward and clarify what kind of accession flexibility they are prepared to support. After the rejection of reverse accession, “enhanced gradual integration” remains the most promising concept and should be developed quickly, ideally before mid-2026, before French and German domestic politics harden further.
Second, governments need to clarify the policy impact of enlargement. This means honestly addressing which EU policies and resources , especially the CAP and cohesion policy , would be extended to future members and under what conditions. But the authors also caution against going too far in limiting core freedoms, especially free movement, beyond standard transition periods.
Third, frontrunners should be reassured. Albania and Montenegro need stronger support to finish negotiations under the current rules. Introducing highly restrictive or second-class forms of membership would likely be counterproductive.
Fourth, member states must prioritize communication and public outreach. Enlargement has entered a critical phase, but public debate across the EU remains strikingly shallow. Governments should explain not only the risks, but also the safeguards and potential gains. They must make the case that enlargement is not charity, but strategy.
Finally, the report argues that the advantages of integrating the Western Balkans, as well as Ukraine and Moldova, need to be much more clearly articulated. For the Western Balkans, three areas stand out in particular: security and defense, including the fact that Albania and Montenegro are already NATO allies; cooperation against irregular migration from third countries; and the contribution candidate countries can make to green industry and future competitiveness.
The authors also urge Germany, France and the Netherlands to build coalitions of the willing with other member states, moving from national reflection papers to joint non-papers at EU level. Only such coalitions, they suggest, can break the stagnant and overly narrow mindset that still dominates too much of the enlargement debate.
A narrowing window
The most striking conclusion is not that Germany, France and the Netherlands oppose enlargement. It is that all three now accept its geopolitical necessity, but none has yet found a politically convincing way to sell it at home.
That matters because the window may be short. A peace arrangement in Ukraine, further progress by Montenegro, an Icelandic referendum, or renewed instability in the Balkans could all force enlargement back onto the top of the European agenda much sooner than expected. If national leaders are unprepared, the EU risks missing a strategic opening once again.
For Albania, this is both a warning and an opportunity. The warning is that support in Brussels is never enough if key capitals are politically unconvinced. The opportunity is that Albania remains one of the few candidates widely seen as capable of actually reaching the finish line this decade ,provided it clears remaining rule-of-law doubts and provided the EU can muster the political will to act.
In that sense, the future of enlargement may depend less on abstract declarations from Brussels than on whether Berlin, Paris and The Hague can turn geopolitical awareness into political courage.
This analysis is based on the study “Europe’s Next Enlargement: What Berlin, Paris, and The Hague Really Think” by Milan Nič, Sébastien Maillard, Wouter Zweers, Dr. Dimitar Bechev, and Nikola Xaviereff.
The full study: https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/europes-next-enlargement
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