by Genc Pollo, President of Paneuropa-Albania
On March 30, at the Nieuwspoort conference center in The Hague, the Director-General for Enlargement at the European Commission, Mr. Gert-Jan Koopman, as a panelist in the debate “The Netherlands and Europe between power blocs,” spoke about the progress of EU enlargement. Regarding Albania, he said that “reforms are being carried out and unprecedented progress is being made; we have gone from zero to the opening of all (negotiation) chapters within one year, at an unimaginable speed. Albania’s expectation is the closing of the chapters by 2027, which suggests that they will maintain the pace of reforms.”
Two days later, COELA — the Working Party on Enlargement of the Council of the EU (composed of the member states) — rejected the European Commission’s proposal to approve Albania’s IBAR (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report). This report would have allowed the advancement of chapter negotiations and, eventually, their closure. The nine member states that opposed it (Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, and Sweden) presented various reasons, ranging from uncorrected embezzlement with the IPARD fund to official abuse with property rights. However, the common leitmotif was the Balluku case: the parliamentary immunity granted by Prime Minister Rama and his ruling majority to the indicted former Infrastructure Minister, as well as the draft law that a priori protects government ministers from judicial action in cases of suspected criminality.
The contrast between Mr. Koopman’s optimistic statements and the non-positive, argumentative positions of a group of member states — who constitute a blocking minority in the Council — is evident. This contrast needs to be explained.
First, it must be said that the premise of the nine member states is true. They express it in the EU jargon as “insufficient progress for a positive IBAR.” Anyone living in Albania who has two cents of common sense and a shred of honesty would formulate the observation differently: for example, that Albania is under an authoritarian and kleptocratic regime (AKR) with some residual elements of pluralism in politics and the media, and which has no relation whatsoever with the foundational principles and values of Europe. This observation is now publicly or privately accepted even by those who support the party in power and benefit from the regime (some of them blame society, the opposition, the media, the internationals, or anyone else except the ruling party and its leader). Meanwhile, public criticism is mistakenly focused on the corruption of officials, which is only a consequence, one of the consequences, of state capture. The latter is illustrated by shocking examples from the AKShI/ Agasi case: according to operational data, gangs that controlled state computer systems manipulated the TIMS border system so that wanted criminals could cross the border without problems; or that “excess” properties of magistrates under vetting “disappeared” from the Cadastre only to reappear once the vetting concluded positively. In the face of such cases, the theft of 20 or 30 million euros in taxpayers’ money pales in comparison.
Second, stating the reality in Albania — whether in diplomatic or direct language — exposes Mr. Koopman’s presentation as unrealistic, illusionist, and propagandistic. In practice, he is selling a con to the Council and the European Parliament (which must decide on the Commission’s proposals) and, since he speaks publicly, also to public opinion in the EU and in Albania.
Third, Koopman is not alone in the European Commission with such delusions. If you recall, three weeks after the indictment of Balluku, the EU Ambassador in Tirana, Mr. Gonzato, when asked on Top Channel about the case, spoke only about the principle of the “presumption of innocence” and said nothing about official responsibility, accountability of power, good governance, or public trust. A few days after the Court suspended Balluku from duty, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos stated that the government’s reaction was appropriate (one day earlier, Prime Minister Rama, in her presence, had declared that he would appeal the suspension to the Constitutional Court). After the IBAR was called into question (end of December 2025), these same officials have begun to relativize official corruption/criminality not as the individual criminal responsibility of the respective official, but as a problem of inappropriate societal reaction.
Fourth, this is not the first time the European Commission has been in contrast with the Council and the European Parliament in its assessment of Albania. Until 2019, the Commission proposed opening negotiations three times without success. German CDU MPs had come several times to Albania on fact-finding missions and had observed a completely different situation from what the rosy progress reports from Brussels presented. This is where the “9 conditions of the Bundestag” originated, which later became the “15 conditions of the European Council” and were confirmed in the European Parliament’s Albania 2020 resolution.
Fifth, and even more important, is the question of why the European Commission behaves this way. The simplest answer is the new geopolitics. Undoubtedly, this plays a role, but let us not forget that this behavior, as mentioned earlier, was demonstrated in our case years before Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. Most likely, the Commission’s political need for a success story of its own, which would justify its work, investment, and existence as an institution. Even when reality is not like that, it is simply ignored, and through cynical bureaucratic power, a parallel and virtual reality is created. This comes, of course, with significant damage to European values in the candidate countries.
Finally, this behavior of the Commission is also reflected in the Albanian government. The Commission’s myopic insistence and self-confidence regarding the opening of negotiations led Prime Minister Rama in 2018 to accord medals to several Albanian ambassadors and open champagne bottles in celebration, making himself ridiculous — the negotiations were actually opened only seven years later. Similarly, at present, the Prime Minister, the minister, and the chief negotiator vehemently deny in public debates that there are any problems or delays with the EU, often referring to statements like those of Mr. Koopman. But this is just the least problem when one thinks that Brussels’ illusions may encourage more Ballukus and Agasis in Tirana.
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