Tirana Times, July 07, 2026 – The next NATO Summit, where the leaders of Allied member states gather annually, will take place on July 7–8, 2026, at the Presidential Complex in Ankara. It will be NATO’s 36th summit and the second hosted by Türkiye, after the Istanbul Summit of 2004.
The final declaration has already been negotiated by all 32 Allies, including the United States, which remains the Alliance’s dominant political and military power, and has been approved at ambassadorial level. Heads of state and government are now expected to formally endorse it on July 8.
Its core message is a reaffirmation of NATO’s “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5, the designation of Russia as a “long-term threat” to Euro-Atlantic security, and a pledge of 70 billion euros in military assistance for Ukraine in 2026, with “at least equivalent levels” in 2027. The declaration also includes strong language stating that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons and calls for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has clearly defined three priorities: further increasing defence investment, strengthening transatlantic defence industrial production, and supporting Ukraine. The central narrative is the transformation of spending into real combat capabilities. Rutte has openly said that the summit will focus on turning additional expenditure into “combat-ready capabilities” and expanding defence industries.
Yet beneath the formal consensus, American dissatisfaction remains visible. Washington continues to question the gap between the political declarations of European Allies and their actual willingness to act as serious partners, beginning with a substantial increase in defence financing, military capabilities and infrastructure.
Perhaps the sharpest assessment of the moment came from a European diplomat who described the Alliance as “alive and active, but somewhat bruised.”
The paradox is clear. On the one hand, Europe has finally delivered, in concrete terms, what had been demanded of it for decades. Europeans and Canada spent 90 billion dollars more on defence in 2025 than the previous year, reaching more than 570 billion dollars in total. Rutte has also spoken of an additional trillion dollars spent since President Trump’s first term, calling it “Trump’s trillion.” The Hague target remains 3.5 percent of GDP for core defence, plus 1.5 percent for defence-related spending, by 2035.
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that this will be politically sufficient. At least four factors must be considered.
The first is the American president himself. He has confirmed his attendance, but with clear reservations. Trump has said he would attend “only out of respect for President Erdogan,” following a personal call from him, and that he would not go “for most of the people” gathered there — a clear reference to European leaders. Only days ago, he repeated his familiar claim that the Allies abandoned the United States during the strike on Iran, describing NATO’s “one-sided” relationship with Washington as “ridiculous.”
The second factor is the American military drawdown. The United States has announced troop withdrawals from Europe, reduced the forces assigned to NATO defence plans — including an aircraft carrier, refuelling aircraft, fighter jets and drones — and launched a six-month review of its military presence on the continent.
This has fuelled the central fear among officials on NATO’s eastern flank: that the Trump administration could “blow up” the fragile bargain through chaotic withdrawals that leave defence gaps. The real question is whether Washington intends to rebalance the Alliance in good faith or simply detach the United States from European security.
The third factor is Greenland and Iran, two issues on which Washington and European capitals have openly clashed. President Trump has not ruled out the use of force to “take” Greenland, a territory belonging to NATO Ally Denmark, while the war with Iran exposed the fact that most Allies did not join the American operation.
The fourth factor is Türkiye. Ankara brings to the Alliance its second-largest army and a crucial geography. It has also become an increasingly important military exporter in Africa and the Middle East. For President Erdogan, the summit is a clear diplomatic victory. Trump’s presence may be accompanied by a significant “gift” for Turkish defence, potentially including F-110 engines and F-35 aircraft, from which Türkiye was excluded in 2019 after purchasing Russia’s S-400 systems.
There is broad agreement that the summit gives Erdogan international legitimacy. In this context, the recent visits of Marta Kos and Ursula von der Leyen to Ankara should also be seen as part of an effort to revive Türkiye’s European integration agenda, at a time when Ankara is viewed as a weighty Ally in an increasingly difficult world of competing global and regional powers.
The Ankara Summit does not possess a magic wand capable of resolving all these tensions. But it may serve as an exercise in perception management: a test of whether the Alliance can “sell” Trump the idea of “NATO 3.0” — a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO, less dependent on the United States but with America still firmly anchored in the Alliance — without provoking a public outburst from him.
This also raises the question of what role is reserved for Albania and what chances remain for a NATO Summit in Tirana next year.
Albania’s role is that of a small Ally seeking to remain relevant through contribution and symbolism. What is expected from Albania first and foremost is a real increase in its financial contribution to the Alliance, as well as a higher share of defence spending relative to GDP. Albania was below the 2 percent GDP threshold in 2025, together with Czechia and Slovenia.
To align itself with NATO expectations, the government is finalising fiscal measures that would raise 2026 spending to 2.6 percent of GDP, of which 2.2 percent would go to core defence and 0.4 percent to other security-related expenditure. Albanian officials have described this as the most ambitious level since the country joined the Alliance.
But the real issue is how this increase will be implemented, and how transparent defence spending will be. Will Albania continue with old accounting tricks, such as moving civil emergencies from one ministry to another, or classifying electoral spending as defence expenditure? Or will it genuinely increase spending on defence and security?
Albania is also trying to stand out as a contributor. On June 12, Tirana co-hosted the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Ministerial Meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, presenting it as a platform for joint engagement in peace and security. But is this enough for Albania to be considered an Ally with specific weight inside NATO and a meaningful contributor to security crises, when its own regional relations are often tense, including with Pristina and Athens?
At last year’s summit in The Hague, leaders officially stated that they looked forward to the next meeting in Türkiye in 2026, “followed by a meeting in Albania.” In other words, the 2027 NATO Summit was expected to take place in Tirana. For Albania, this would be the most important diplomatic event ever hosted in the country.
Recently, however, two threats have cast doubt over that prospect.
The first threat is specific to Albania. According to Reuters, the current draft of the Ankara declaration does not mention holding the next summit in Albania, unlike an earlier declaration. Sources say the reason is Albania’s low defence spending. If NATO were to hold a summit there in 2027, Trump could react angrily, producing negative headlines — precisely what Europeans want to avoid as they try to show Trump progress, not weakness.
The second threat is structural and more serious. Reuters reported in April that NATO is considering abandoning the practice of annual summits altogether, a move that would avoid another tense confrontation with Trump later in his term. If that happens, the problem would not be Tirana; it would be that there may be no next summit in the previous format at all.
A third element, no less important, is the curve of domestic protests in Albania and whether they continue at the same pace or intensify from autumn onward. The fact that next year is also an electoral year, when tensions usually deepen and the political climate enters a sharper phase of polarization, represents another domestic factor that could raise questions about the security required for such a format — even if the other conditions improve in Albania’s favour.
What matters is that the possible summit should not be viewed, as often happens, through the narrow lens of political capital for the ruling party or as an electoral asset if it takes place. It should instead be seen as an opportunity to raise Albania’s geopolitical profile at a time of systemic crises, when even the Alliance itself is not immune.
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Prof. Ilir Kalemaj is the Acting Rector of New York University Tirana and Senior Associate Researcher at the Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS).
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