Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha says Tirana will not extend the controversial agreement beyond 2030, arguing that Albania expects to be inside the European Union by then
Tirana Times, May 12, 2026 – Albania does not intend to extend its controversial migration agreement with Italy beyond 2030, Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha has said, placing a clear political limit on one of Europe’s most closely watched experiments in offshore migration management.
In an exclusive interview with Euractiv, Hoxha said the agreement signed between Prime Minister Edi Rama and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was designed as a five-year arrangement and should not be seen as an open-ended model.
“First of all, it’s for five years and I’m not sure that there will be an extension. Second, there will be no extension because we will be a member of the European Union,” Hoxha said.
His remarks are significant because they come at a moment when the Italian government is preparing a renewed push to bring the Albania migration centres back to their original function. According to reports in the Italian press, Prime Minister Meloni’s government is working on a new decree that would restore the initial formula of the agreement: using the centres in Gjadër and Shëngjin for migrants intercepted at sea, rather than only as repatriation detention centres for migrants whose asylum claims have already been rejected in Italy.
The Italy Albania migration agreement, ratified in early 2024, has been among the most controversial arrangements in European migration policy. It was presented by Rome as an innovative solution to reduce irregular arrivals and accelerate asylum and return procedures. Under the deal, Italy would operate facilities on Albanian territory, while Albania would provide the territory and political cooperation.
However, the project quickly encountered legal and political obstacles. Italian courts challenged aspects of the arrangement, forcing Rome to adjust its original plan. Instead of functioning primarily as processing centres for migrants rescued or intercepted at sea, the facilities were repurposed as CPR-style detention centres for rejected asylum seekers awaiting repatriation.
That shift created a new political problem for Meloni. Critics in Italy argued that the centres risked becoming an expensive symbol of failure. The reported cost of the operation has been estimated at around 670 million euros for the 2024–2028 period, while the centres have struggled to function as initially promised.
Now, according to Italian media reporting cited in the Albanian material, Rome is preparing a new intervention, expected as early as June, to return to what has been described as “Plan A.” The Italian government appears to be waiting for the implementation of the EU’s new Migration and Asylum Pact, due to enter into force in June 2026, hoping that the new European framework will provide stronger legal and political backing for the Albania model.
Hoxha’s intervention therefore comes at a delicate time. While Rome is seeking to revive and strengthen the model, Tirana is signaling that the agreement has an expiration date.
The foreign minister framed Albania’s cooperation with Italy not as a concession extracted from a weaker country, but as an act of partnership between close allies. “Italy needed help. We helped. And that cannot be forgotten,” Hoxha said.
Prime Minister Edi Rama has repeatedly defended the arrangement as “exclusive,” stressing Albania’s close historical, political and human ties with Italy. For Rama, the agreement has been presented as a gesture of solidarity toward a strategic partner rather than a model Albania would automatically offer to other EU countries.
But the deal has also exposed Albania to criticism from human rights organizations, opposition voices and migration experts, who have argued that the country risks becoming a testing ground for European outsourcing policies. Across Europe, governments facing pressure over migration are increasingly exploring ways to move asylum procedures, detention or return mechanisms beyond their own borders.
That wider European context is becoming more important. According to the material provided, European ministers are expected to discuss plans for sending rejected asylum seekers to centres in third countries. Council of Europe Secretary General Alain Berset has stressed that even when migrants are moved outside the immediate territory of EU states, they remain human beings whose rights must be protected under the European Convention on Human Rights.
This is precisely where the Albanian case becomes politically sensitive. Albania is not simply a third country on Europe’s periphery. It is a NATO member, an EU candidate country and a state that has set 2030 as its target for joining the European Union. Hoxha’s argument is that once Albania becomes an EU member, the logic of the current arrangement changes completely.
“Once Albania joins, that is no longer extraterritorial, it’s the territory of the European Union,” he told Euractiv.
This point goes to the heart of the debate. The political value of the Albania model for Italy lies partly in its extraterritorial character. The facilities are outside Italian territory, even though they are operated under Italian responsibility. If Albania joins the EU, the centres would no longer sit outside the Union’s legal and territorial space in the same way.
For Tirana, the 2030 deadline is therefore not only a technical date. It is a diplomatic message. Albania is willing to help Italy now, but not at the price of being permanently positioned as Europe’s external migration platform.
The statement also removes a possible ambiguity in Albania’s EU diplomacy. Some critics have suggested that Italy, as one of Albania’s strongest supporters in the EU enlargement process, could have an interest in keeping Albania outside the Union in order to preserve the offshore character of the migration centres. Hoxha dismissed that logic, insisting that Italy’s support for Albania’s EU path remains strong and that the migration arrangement should not be interpreted as an obstacle to accession.
In Italy, meanwhile, the opposition continues to challenge the government’s approach. According to the material, Riccardo Magi of +Europa has demanded clarity on the real content of the new Italy Albania strategic cooperation agreement, warning that any attempt to change again the function of the centres would be another effort to present as innovation what opponents see as a failed and inhumane policy.
The coming months will show whether Meloni’s government can successfully relaunch the Albania centres under the emerging EU migration framework. But Hoxha’s message has already defined Albania’s position: the agreement may continue until the end of the decade, but not beyond Albania’s expected entry into the European Union.
For now, the Albania Italy migration deal remains both a bilateral arrangement and a European test case. For Rome, it is a political instrument in the struggle to control irregular migration. For Brussels, it is part of a broader debate on whether migration management can be externalized without undermining rights and legal obligations. For Tirana, it is a delicate balancing act between loyalty to a close ally and the strategic objective of EU membership.
By setting 2030 as the political horizon, Albania is making clear that its future role is not to stand outside Europe’s borders, but to join the European Union as a full member.
Source: Euractiv; Repubblica; Albanian press
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