The Strategic Price of Non-Enlargement

By Albert Rakipi

Tirana Times, June 30, 2026 – For more than two decades, the Western Balkans have lived inside the promise of European integration. In Albania, support for membership in the European Union has often remained above 90 percent. I have sometimes described this support as almost “totalitarian.” Yet this overwhelming support does not automatically mean democratic understanding, informed debate, or real local ownership of the process.

This is one of the central challenges facing the European integration project in our region today. European integration cannot be treated as a magical solution that will simply arrive from Brussels. It is not a technical miracle, nor a political shortcut. It is a process of social, economic, institutional and political transformation. In the case of Albania, it has also been a driving force of state-building.

For this reason, the democratization of the European integration process is essential. It is not EU membership alone that transforms countries and societies. What transforms them is the process itself: building a functioning state, a stronger economy, higher standards, the rule of law, accountable institutions and the capacity to provide basic public goods to citizens.

This requires local ownership. Without it, European integration risks becoming an abstract diplomatic language, understood by specialists but not felt by citizens. It becomes a process discussed in Brussels, reported in progress reports, praised in official speeches, but not sufficiently rooted in the daily transformation of our societies.

At the Albanian Institute for International Studies, we have long tried to contribute to Albania’s European integration through a critical, research-based and bottom-up approach. Through publications, public debates, policy forums and exchanges with countries that joined the European Union during different waves of enlargement, our aim has been to encourage precisely this democratic ownership of the process.

But there is another challenge, perhaps even deeper: the cultural imagination of Europe.

A distinguished professor of European studies, Hélène Ahrweiler, once observed that when people from the Balkans decide to visit Rome, Paris or Berlin, they often say: “We are going to Europe.” Even Greeks sometimes say they are “going to Europe” when they travel to Brussels, London or Berlin, although Greece has been a member of the European Union for more than four decades.

This tells us something important. In our imagination, there are in fact two Europes.

One is Europe as a myth: distant, almost unreachable, a symbol of prosperity, order and civilization beyond us. The other is Europe as a reality: a space of institutions, values, development, freedom, modernization and the rule of law.

Europe as a myth will continue to exist. And like all myths, it is somehow unreachable. But Europe as a reality is possible.

The real question, therefore, is not whether the Western Balkans are geographically part of Europe. That question has long been settled. The real question is how to make the Albanian village, the Serbian village, the Macedonian village, the Kosovar village and the Georgian village European villages.

There is no single “European village.” There is a French village, a German village, a Polish village. Europe becomes real not through mythology, but through institutions, standards, rights, freedoms, public services and accountable government. To achieve this, both sides the Balkans and the European institutions  must escape the cultural trap of seeing Europe only as a myth.

The third and perhaps most urgent point is geopolitical.

In geopolitical terms, enlargement is not only possible. It is necessary.

If we look at the map of Europe today, the Western Balkans appear almost as an island surrounded by member states of the European Union. This geographic reality has strategic consequences. If the European Union does not enlarge within its own continent, in these strategic spaces, others will fill the vacuum. Third powers will intervene politically, economically and strategically through disinformation, corruption, energy dependency and influence over security.

The European project was, from the very beginning, a peace project. It was also a security project. For a long time, Europe viewed the Balkans primarily as a security concern. That equation is no longer relevant. From a security and geopolitical perspective, the Balkans should now be seen as a security partner.

Enlargement has always had a geopolitical and security dimension. This is not new. The third wave of enlargement, which included Greece and later Spain and Portugal, took place in the context of the Cold War and the East-West divide. For these countries, European integration was not only a question of economic development. It was also a strategic choice.

The same logic applies today. Enlargement is not a favor granted to candidate countries. It is a strategic investment in Europe’s own stability, security and credibility.

This is why the debate must change. For years, Europe has discussed the cost of enlargement: the financial burden, institutional complexity, political difficulties and reform challenges. These are legitimate concerns. But they are only one side of the equation.

The more urgent question is the cost of non-enlargement.

What does Europe lose if it leaves the Western Balkans in a prolonged grey zone? What happens to democratic reforms when the accession process loses credibility? What happens to public trust when societies are asked to reform endlessly without a clear political horizon? What happens to European influence when other actors are ready to fill the vacuum?

The answer is clear: Europe loses stability, credibility and strategic depth. Candidate countries lose momentum, trust and reform incentives. The region becomes more vulnerable to authoritarian influence, corruption, disinformation and geopolitical competition.

The question before us today is therefore not only what candidate countries would gain from enlargement. The question is also what Europe would lose from non-enlargement.

Europe’s map remains unfinished. Completing it is not only a Balkan aspiration. It is a European necessity.

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This article is based on remarks delivered by Albert Rakipi at the conference ““Mission Possible: Enlargement and Restoring the Union’s Credibility and Global Influence.” organized by the Albanian Institute for International Studies in Brussels one week ago.

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